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 I became Corporation Counsel in September 1991, and remained in that office 
until the end of Mayor Dinkins’ administration twenty-seven months later.  At the 
time I became Corporation Counsel, I had well-informed notions regarding the work 
of a large government law office; the kinds of matters handled and the type of staff 
needed to do the important work of representing a unit of government such as the 
city of New York.  For seven years prior to joining the city Law Department, I had 
served as deputy solicitor general and then as solicitor general of New York State. 
The solicitor general is an appointee of the attorney general and oversees all of the 
appellate work of the attorney general’s office.  As solicitor general, I had the 
opportunity to handle every type of case a government law office may encounter—
tax, environmental, constitutional law, including Commerce Clause issues, First 
Amendment, Fourteenth Amendment, Eleventh Amendment, and even original 
jurisdiction matters.  I also dealt with appeals involving areas such as consumer fraud, 
New York labor law, antitrust, municipal finance, municipal law, appropriation, 
known in New York City as condemnation, and much more.
 Any mayor can be expected to select as his Corporation Counsel a lawyer whose 
views are aligned with his policy perspectives.  The Corporation Counsel should be 
prepared to manage the office consistent with the mayor’s priorities.  I suspect that 
Mayor Dinkins’ decision to appoint me reflected his judgment that my views would 
be aligned with his on matters of policy.
 The election of David Dinkins as the city’s 106th mayor was a momentous event 
for the city.  Mayor Dinkins was elected mayor by a broad, multi-racial coalition that 
the city had not seen in quite some time.  He was the first African American to be 
elected mayor of the city.  One of the central themes of his administration was to 
have the richly diverse population of the city reflected in city government.
 Mayor Edward Koch, who preceded Mayor Dinkins, was a provocative mayor, 
especially on matters of race.  As solicitor general, I had witnessed first-hand the 
impact of his views on the positions taken by the Law Department.  In 1985, the 
United States Supreme Court agreed to hear an appeal from a decision of the Second 
Circuit upholding a remedial goal of 29.23% minority membership in the Local 28 
of the Sheet Metal Workers’ International Association, a union that represents sheet 
metal workers employed by contractors in the New York City metropolitan area.1 
Judge Werker, of the Southern District Court of New York, had imposed this 
remedial goal in a case brought by the city, the state, and the Equal Employment 
Opportunity Commission against New York City based Sheetmetal Workers Union 
Local 28 and its apprenticeship committee.2  Prior to the time the case reached the 
Supreme Court, for over twenty-one years, the union had resisted fifty-five court 
orders and had preserved a deeply entrenched tradition of favoring the relatives of 
union members.  As a result of this favoritism, minorities were excluded from well-
paying construction jobs.
 With the backing of the United States Department of Justice, the union argued 
before the Supreme Court that the numerical remedy imposed by the lower courts 
1. Local 28 of the Sheet Metal Workers’ Int’l Ass’n v. Equal Employment Opportunity Comm’n, 478 U.S. 
421 (1986).
2. Equal Employment Opportunity Comm’n v. Local 638, 401 F. Supp. 467, 489 (S.D.N.Y. 1975).
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violated Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 and the Fourteenth Amendment 
of the United States Constitution.3  Shortly after the Supreme Court agreed to hear 
the case, I spoke with Fritz Schwarz, then Corporation Counsel.  We agreed that 
the city and the state would collaborate and argue for affirmance of the decision of 
the Second Circuit.  On the day before the briefs of the city and state were due to be 
filed, Fritz told me that the city would not be arguing for affirmance.  Although he 
did not say so, it was clear that the Law Department’s original plan to argue for 
affirmance of the numerical goal had been overruled by Mayor Koch.4  As a result, 
the city’s brief concluded that the judgment below should be affirmed, except for the 
numerical goal imposed by the lower courts.  Thus, the state was the only party 
before the Supreme Court arguing for affirmance of the numerical goal.5
 David Dinkins inherited a racially divided city and a deteriorating economy from 
Mayor Koch.  Racial incidents in Howard Beach, Queens and in Bensonhurst, 
Brooklyn, in which African Americans were beaten by whites, symbolized the racial 
tensions at the time.  It fell to Mayor Dinkins to manage the city during a period of 
economic decline and to heal racial wounds.
 Perhaps the biggest challenge I faced was managing the Law Department in a 
deteriorating economy.  The poor health of the city’s economy had resulted in layoffs 
of lawyers, the first such layoffs since the city’s fiscal crisis in the 1970s during the 
Beame administration.  At the same time, the caseload handled by Law Department 
lawyers was increasing.  Shortly after my arrival, the Mayor imposed salary cuts for 
managers in all agencies.  Other city agencies took far deeper cuts than the Law 
Department.  Throughout, the Law Department needed to address court and 
legislative mandates regarding the homeless, special education, police hiring, and a 
host of other matters.
 Prior to my appointment, Victor Kovner had served as Corporation Counsel for 
twenty-one months, after which he returned to private practice.  Upon taking office, 
Victor took charge of the Law Department’s responsibility to implement a new City 
Charter.  That Charter was made necessary by a 9-0 decision of the United States 
Supreme Court in Board of Estimate of City of New York v. Morris,6 which held that 
the composition of the Board of Estimate,7 where the roughly 250,000 Staten Island 
residents enjoyed the same voting power as the 2.5 million Brooklyn residents, 
3. See Local 28 Sheet Metal Workers, 478 U.S. at 440.
4. I learned recently that the city’s draft brief was changed four times as city hall debated the position to 
take in the Supreme Court.
5. The Supreme Court ruled that the lower courts have authority to impose non-victim-specific numerical 
goals to remedy identified racial discrimination and upheld the goal ordered in the case.  See Local 28 
Sheet Metal Workers, 478 U.S. 421.
6. 489 U.S. 688 (1989).
7. The Board of Estimate was widely viewed as the center of power in the city.  Its members were the 
mayor, the comptroller, and the five borough presidents.  Its powers included responsibility for zoning 
regulation, concessions and franchises, and city contracts.
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violated the one-person, one-vote requirement of the Constitution.8  Under the new 
Charter, which was adopted by referendum in 1989, the Board of Estimate was 
abolished and its powers redistributed between an enhanced city council and the 
mayor.  The new Charter, however, left a wide range of issues unresolved, and it fell 
to the Law Department, under Victor Kovner’s leadership, to sort out the jurisdiction 
of authority lines and to attend to the details of the new allocation of power.
 Work to implement the new city charter was a key initiative of the Law 
Department during Victor’s tenure.  That work was far from complete when I arrived. 
One important and complex area concerned city procurement practices.  The Charter 
provided for creation of a Procurement Policy Board, comprised of three mayoral and 
two comptroller appointees, who were to set and oversee city procurement policy, a 
function formerly exercised by the Board of Estimate.  Mayor Dinkins appointed 
John Grubin, a lawyer in private practice and former chief of the Law Department 
Division of Commercial Litigation, as chair of the Procurement Policy Board.  I was 
appointed to the board and in that capacity helped to shape the policies and 
regulations governing procurement.
 In a related area, Mayor Dinkins proposed, and the city council enacted, 
legislation intended to substantially increase the participation of minority-owned 
and female-owned businesses in city contracts.  The Law Department guided the 
preparation of a “disparity study,” which served as the basis for the remedial, race, 
and gender conscious elements of the law.9  The Law Department also drafted the 
ordinance and implementing regulations.  Together with Deputy Mayor for Finance 
and Economic Development Barry Sullivan, the Law Department actively monitored 
city departments’ performance.  By the end of 1993, the value of city contracts won 
by minority-owned and female-owned businesses had increased from under five 
percent to seventeen percent.10
 A reduction of the political power of Staten Island was an intended consequence 
of the Supreme Court’s ruling in Morris, and the new Charter was adopted as a 
result of that decision.  Unhappy with the new regime, residents of Staten Island, led 
by then Borough President Guy Molinari, commenced a campaign for Staten Island 
to secede from the city and to create an independent city of Staten Island.  Mayors 
Koch and Dinkins opposed the plan.
 The Law Department assumed the lead role in opposing the secessionist 
movement.  Among other things, the Law Department challenged the constitutionality 
8. Morris, 489 U.S. at 690–91.
9. Under City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469 (1989), where a state law or local ordinance 
purports to use race or gender-based criteria in awarding public contracts that are intended to eradicate 
the effects of prior discrimination, the law or ordinance must be supported by particularized evidence of 
that prior discrimination in the affected community sufficient to satisfy the requirements of the Equal 
Protection Clause.  The “disparity study” undertaken by the city was conducted to address this 
requirement.
10. Mayor Giuliani opposed the city’s minority-owned and female-owned business law and allowed its 
implementing regulations to lapse.  Thereafter, city contracts awarded to such businesses fell to levels 
below those at the end of the Koch administration.
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of a state law that purported to prescribe procedures for evaluating the interest of 
Staten Islanders in seceding from New York City and the basis on which Staten 
Islanders wished to accomplish such secession.11  The law provided for a referendum 
of Staten Island residents to establish a charter commission composed of only Staten 
Island residents and legislators, and for Staten Island legislators to draft a proposed 
charter for a new city of Staten Island.  The commission was expected to conclude its 
work by 1992.  The Law Department’s efforts in court to bar secession and prevent 
the establishment of the secessionist charter commission were unsuccessful.  The 
Court of Appeals of New York, in City of New York v. State, ruled that the city’s 
home rule powers had not been violated because the legislation authorizing the 
creation of the commission did not authorize secession.12  Rather, the law merely 
allowed voters to express their views on the subject.  Actual secession would require 
further legislative action.  What followed was a series of hearings on the question of 
secession, in which the Law Department provided testimony on why secession was 
bad policy, impractical, and unconstitutional.  Nevertheless, secessionist fever raged 
on in Staten Island and for a time spread to eastern Queens, where a member of the 
state assembly held hearings on the possible secession of eastern Queens from the 
city.  Throughout, the issue of race ran just below the surface.  The Staten Island 
secession commission produced a charter, but the state legislature declined to approve 
it.
 In the face of shrinking city revenues, Mayor Dinkins lobbied the legislature and 
secured a tax increase in order to fund the hiring of police officers.  The Mayor 
sought to restore the police department numbers to levels that existed prior to the 
onset of the fiscal crisis of the middle 1970s.  Despite his commitment to public 
safety and to an enhanced police department, the Mayor and the police unions 
remained at odds through much of his administration.
 Thanks to the work of my predecessors, probably dating back to the administration 
of J. Lee Rankin during the Lindsay administration, and in no small measure to the 
leadership of Alan Schwartz, I inherited a professional Law Department of some 
550 lawyers and a merit-based hiring and promotion system that I believe resulted in 
one of the finest government law departments in the United States.  In this sense, 
the Law Department was similar to the office of the New York Attorney General, 
with which I was familiar.  The staffs were not drawn from traditional civil service 
lists, and membership in a political club carried no sway in hiring or promotion 
11. See City of New York v. State, 146 Misc. 2d 488 (1990) (challenging the constitutionality of Staten 
Island’s succession under Chapter 773 of the Laws of 1989).
12. City of New York v. State, 76 N.Y.2d 479 (1990).  The New York Court of Appeals held:
   Chapter 773 does not authorize secession; it does not authorize the voters of Staten Island 
to decide the secession issue; it does not initiate secession, or commit the State to support 
it; it does not represent any relinquishment by the Legislature of any power it may have 
with respect to secession; and it in no way circumscribes whatever protections exist in the 
State Constitution home rule provision with respect to an act formally triggering 
secession.
 Id. at 486.
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decisions.  Instead, lawyers were selected much in the way they are selected at law 
firms.  The important factors were academic performance, quality of work experience, 
writing and reasoning abilities as exhibited in writing samples, and oral communication 
skills as demonstrated in a rigorous interview process.
 A relatively high percentage of the executives and senior managers in both offices 
were graduates of prestigious undergraduate colleges and law schools.  The attorney 
general’s office tended to hire its executives directly from the private sector and 
institutions outside of government.  When I arrived at the Law Department, virtually 
all of its top executives were accomplished career city employees who had been 
promoted up through the ranks.  A substantial number were hired upon law school 
graduation or shortly thereafter into an honors program developed two decades 
earlier by J. Lee Rankin and Norman Redlich, who headed the office during the 
Lindsey administration.  Most had been promoted to the jobs they held during the 
Koch administration.
 In both offices, the line lawyers, supervisors, and some managers were drawn 
largely from regional and local law schools.  These excellent lawyers tended to have 
been at or near the top of their law school classes.  They represented the best tradition 
of the Department.  Due largely to low salary structures, both offices suffered from 
high turnover rates, especially among junior lawyers.  Layoffs, delayed hiring, and 
pay cuts for managers further contributed to staff turnover during my tenure.
 Within the Law Department, I took the challenge of persuading career executives 
and managers of the importance and urgency of increasing diversity.  In a city where 
African Americans and Hispanics constituted over fifty percent of the population, 
few members of either group could be found in the Law Department.  As of 1991, 
there was only one non-white executive in the Law Department.  She was hired by 
Victor Kovner and was the only non-white person to hold an executive level position 
since Harry Dodds left the Law Department in 1973.  Dodds reports that there were 
no minority persons heading an operating division during his tenure and that only 
one non-white person held a line management position since his departure.13
 As of 1991, none of the seventeen division chiefs were minority persons.  Of the 
ten borough branch offices, one was headed by a minority person.  The same pattern 
existed at the deputy division chief level.
 Although women represented half of the lawyers hired, a much smaller percentage 
occupied executive or managerial positions.14  As of 1992, four of thirteen executives 
were women.  Two women held the position of division chief; one woman headed a 
borough office.
 More disturbing than the absence of minorities in senior positions was the fact 
that very few minorities held positions that were likely to lead to promotion to 
supervisory and other leadership positions in the Department within a reasonable 
number of years.  Women were present in these ranks, but were underrepresented.
13. Lew Necco, who is Hispanic, was a division chief.  He later became general counsel for the police 
department.
14. There were several women in supervisory jobs.
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 In my view, these dismal statistics were the result of a lack of attention by senior 
management to recruiting and hiring minority lawyers, and a failure to ensure that 
minority and female lawyers receive challenging work assignments that provided 
opportunities for professional growth.  I saw no evidence of conscious discrimination 
by senior management.
 In the last two years of the Koch administration, only eight percent of the lawyers 
hired were African American or Hispanic.  This rate of hiring was not due to an 
absence of available talent.  Over twenty percent of the lawyers hired during the 
following two years under Victor Kovner were African American or Hispanic. 
Furthermore, African American or Hispanic lawyers represented almost forty percent 
of all lawyers hired during my tenure.  Women constituted over fifty-five percent of 
all lawyers hired during the same period.
 The lack of minority lawyers posed a number of problems for the Law 
Department.  First, the profile of Law Department personnel stood in stark contrast 
with the diversity of New York City itself, and with Mayor Dinkins’s vision of the 
government of a city whose population he regularly described as a “gorgeous mosaic.” 
Second, diversity was essential for preserving the Law Department’s role as counsel 
to the city, city agencies, commissioners, and the city council.  An absence of diversity 
in the Department, given the diversity within other city agencies, could have 
threatened the confidence and trust of agencies the Department represents.  I was 
aware of two commissioners who lacked confidence that the Law Department could 
be counted on to support all of their policies and the Mayor’s policies.  Although this 
lack of confidence was not justified in my view—Law Department lawyers were 
zealous advocates for the city and its leadership—we could not ignore these 
sentiments.  Finally, the Law Department traditionally has trained and supplied a 
pool of talented men and women who successive mayors have tapped to fill leadership 
positions.  The Law Department needed to preserve its standing as a go-to source of 
talent for the city, including diverse talent.
 It did not take me long to gain a sense of the reasons why there was such a 
glaring lack of minority lawyers in responsible positions within the Law Department. 
The Law Department was not perceived as a place of opportunity by minority 
lawyers.  Over the years, the Law Department had hired superbly talented young 
lawyers, a number of whom were members of minority groups.  Some of our well-
regarded African American lawyers, who were in the Law Department when I 
arrived, told me they saw little opportunity for advancement and were seeking jobs 
elsewhere.  Several minority lawyers who had left the Law Department told me they 
left for the same reason.  It appeared to me that the Department had missed 
opportunities and had failed to identify, train, and challenge minority lawyers 
because it had not made the retention of diverse lawyers a priority.
 I determined to make diversity a priority for the Law Department.  Within 
months of my arrival, I held a retreat for senior managers.  We discussed areas of 
weakness that needed attention, including the need to improve morale in an 
environment of continuing low compensation, to enhance training opportunities, 
and to recruit, hire, and retain diverse lawyers.  To my surprise, some felt that the 
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retreat was a precursor to a house cleaning and replacement of senior lawyers with 
minorities and women from outside the Department.  Before leaving the retreat, I 
reassured the staff that there was not a plan to terminate anyone.  I urged the staff to 
recruit and to challenge promising young lawyers so that the Department could 
sustain and refresh itself with a cadre of new and upcoming leaders.
 In addition, I discontinued the practice of promoting almost exclusively from 
within divisions.  I expanded the pool of potential candidates for promotion by 
recruiting across division lines for all vacancies.  This system was used in the Office 
of the Attorney General, and it enabled that office to identify and promote the most 
promising candidates.  I also expanded recruitment for line management positions to 
candidates outside the Law Department.
 By the end of my tenure, there were tangible signs of progress.  The percentages 
of minorities and women hired and promoted increased measurably.  Several now 
hold supervisory or managerial positions.  These lawyers continue the Law 
Department’s historic role as a critical participant in governance of the city.
